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Ballester, Coralio; Calvó-Armengol, Antoni; Zenou, Yves - 2009

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003848306

Ballester, Coralio; Calvó-Armengol, Antoni; Zenou, Yves - In: Journal of the European Economic Association 8 (2010) 1, pp. 34-61

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008649315

Who's who in networks : wanted: the key player

Ballester, Coralio; Calvó-Armengol, Antoni; Zenou, Yves - In: Econometrica : journal of the Econometric Society, an … 74 (2006) 5, pp. 1403-1417

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003380407

Key player policies when contextual effects matter

Ballester, Coralio; Zenou, Yves - 2012

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009512149

Delinquent networks

Ballester, Coralio; Calvó-Armengol, Antoni; Zenou, Yves - 2009

; delinquency decision ; key group ; NP-hard problem ; crime policies …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003831247

Who's who in crime networks : wanted - the key player

Ballester, Coralio; Calvó-Armengol, Antoni; Zenou, Yves - 2004

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002123916

Who's who in networks : wanted: the key player

Ballester, Coralio; Calvó-Armengol, Antoni; Zenou, Yves - 2005

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003226129

Who's who in crime network : wanted the key player

Ballester, Coralio (contributor); … - 2004 - [Elektronische Ressource]

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002007765

Delinquent Networks

Ballester, Coralio - 2009

Delinquents are embedded in a network of relationships. Social ties among delinquents are modeled by means of a graph where delinquents compete for a booty and benefit from local interactions with their neighbors. Each delinquent decides in a non-cooperative way how much delinquency effort he...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012763925