We study the design of mechanisms without money for repeated allocation of resources among competing agents. Such mechanisms are gaining widespread use in allocating physical and/or computing resources in universities and companies, and also distributing of public goods like vaccines among...

In many settings, resources are allocated among agents repeatedly over time without the use of monetary transfers: consider, for example, allocating server-time to company employees, rooms to students, or food among food banks. Here, the central challenge is to allocate resources efficiently...

Collusion has long been the Achilles heel of mechanism design, as most results break down when participating agents can collude. The issue is more severe when monetary transfers (bribes) between agents are feasible, wherein it is known that truthful revelation and efficient allocation are...

Non-monetary mechanisms for repeated allocation and decision-making are gaining widespread use in many real-world settings. Our aim in this work is to study the performance and incentive properties of simple mechanisms based on artificial currencies in such settings.To this end, we make the...