-seller relationship with renegotiation. Our paper provides causal experimental evidence that an initial contract has a highly significant … threatpoints. We compare situations in which an initial contract is renegotiated to strategically equivalent bargaining situations … in which no ex ante contract was written. The ex ante contract causes sellers to ask for markups that are 45 percent …

initial contract has a highly significant and economically important impact on renegotiation behavior that goes beyond the … effect of contracts on bargaining threatpoints. We compare situations in which an initial contract is renegotiated to … strategically equivalent bargaining situations in which no ex ante contract was written. The ex ante contract causes sellers to ask …

initial contract has a highly significant and economically important impact on renegotiation behavior that goes beyond the … effect of contracts on bargaining threatpoints. We compare situations in which an initial contract is renegotiated to … strategically equivalent bargaining situations in which no ex ante contract was written. The ex ante contract causes sellers to ask …

initial contract has a highly significant and economically important impact on renegotiation behavior that goes beyond the … effect of contracts on bargaining threatpoints. We compare situations in which an initial contract is renegotiated to … strategically equivalent bargaining situations in which no ex ante contract was written. The ex ante contract causes sellers to ask …

Under weak contract enforcement the trading parties' trust, defined as their belief in other's trustworthiness, appears … important for realizing gains from trade. In contrast, under strong contract enforcement beliefs about other's trustworthiness … appear less important, suggesting that trust and contract enforcement are substitutes. Here we show, however, that trust and …

Under weak contract enforcement the trading parties' trust, defined as their belief in other's trustworthiness, appears … important for realizing gains from trade. In contrast, under strong contract enforcement beliefs about other's trustworthiness … appear less important, suggesting that trust and contract enforcement are substitutes. Here we show, however, that trust and …

Under weak contract enforcement the trading parties’ trust, defined as their belief in other’s trustworthiness, appears … important for realizing gains from trade. In contrast, under strong contract enforcement beliefs about other’s trustworthiness … appear less important, suggesting that trust and contract enforcement are substitutes. Here we show, however, that trust and …

likely to reject given markups in renegotiations than in negotiations. These effects do not depend on whether the contract …How does an ex ante contract affect behavior in an ex post renegotiation game? We address this question in a canonical … buyer-seller relationship with renegotiation. Our paper provides causal experimental evidence that an initial contract has a …