Abstract In this paper I will give an example of a population game and of a locally improving stochastic learning process such that the quantal response equilibrium assigns to the different strategies the probabilities that are non-monotone in the payoffs. Moreover, if the initial state...

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In this paper I apply the Hamiltonian method to solve the relaxed multidimensional screening problem. I also illustrate by some examples that the Hamiltonian technique coupled with implementability criterion developed by Carlier [2002] sometimes allows us to arrive at a complete solution of a...

In this paper I described group theoretic methods that can be used for analyzing the boundary problems, which arise when the Hamiltonian method is applied to solve the relaxed problem for the multidimensional screening problem. This technique can provide some useful insights into the structure...

We examine the implications of worker heterogeneity on the equilibrium matching process, using a directed search model. Worker abilities are selected from a general distribution, subject to some weak regularity requirements, and the firms direct their job offers to workers. We identify...

We extend Armstrong’s (1996) result on exclusion in multi-dimensional screening models in two key ways, providing support for the view that this result is quite generic and applicable to many different markets. First, we relax the strong technical assumptions he imposed on preferences and...

In this paper I consider a monopolistic screening model with continuum of types when the type set is a disconnected subset of the real line. I prove that the product line remains connected provided that the gap in the type space is sufficiently small. I also use the results to show that the...

In this paper I propose a model where social skills of a manager signal the workers that their e¤ort is productive. In this model …rms with a high productivity of e¤ort hire a socially skilled manager and pay higher wages, and workers hired by these …rms exert higher e¤ort. In a broader...

In this paper I consider a model of coexisting moral hazard and adverse selection, similar to one considered by Guesnerie, Picard, and Rey (1989). I provide an explicit solution for the optimal incentive scheme in the case, when the effort is observed with a normally distributed error. The main...

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