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In this paper we examine the impact of tax contracts as a novel institution on elections, policies, and welfare. We consider a political game in which three parties compete to form the government. Parties have policy preferences about the level of public-good provision and benefit from perks...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008746679
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In this paper we examine the impact of tax contracts as a novel institution on elections, policies, and welfare. We consider a political game in which three parties compete to form the government. Parties have policy preferences about the level of public-good provision and benefit from perks...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014199808
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009702577
private information truthfully before voting takes place. Depending on the distance between two feasible public good levels …, the optimal mechanism involves either one or two voting rounds. We show that procedural efficiency cannot be achieved by … communication among all citizens prior to voting. Finally, we outline several applications of the mechanism. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011444451
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012591691
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002505772
In this paper we examine the impact of tax contracts as a novel institution on elections, policies, and welfare. We consider a political game in which three parties compete to form the government. Parties have policy preferences about the level of public-good provision and benefit from perks...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011753187
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013414442
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001346637