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Sophisticated attacks on decoy ballots : a devil's menu and the market for lemons

Gersbach, Hans; Mamageishvili, Akaki; Tejada, Oriol - 2017 - This version: November 2017

Decoy ballots do not count in election outcomes, but otherwise they are indistinguishable from real ballots. By means of a game-theoretical model, we show that decoy ballots may not provide effective protection against a malevolent adversary trying to buy real ballots. If the citizenry is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011787216

Information aggregation in democratic mechanisms

Britz, Volker; Gersbach, Hans - 2016 - This version: January 22, 2016

private information truthfully before voting takes place. Depending on the distance between two feasible public good levels …, the optimal mechanism involves either one or two voting rounds. We show that procedural efficiency cannot be achieved by … communication among all citizens prior to voting. Finally, we outline several applications of the mechanism. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011444451

Information sharing in democratic mechanisms

Britz, Volker; Gersbach, Hans - In: International journal of game theory : official journal … 49 (2020) 2, pp. 547-577

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012591691

Tax Contracts and Elections

Gersbach, Hans; Schneider, Maik T. - 2010

In this paper we examine the impact of tax contracts as a novel institution on elections, policies, and welfare. We consider a political game in which three parties compete to form the government. Parties have policy preferences about the level of public-good provision and benefit from perks...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014199808