We study the strategic interaction between a new good producer and a remanufacturer who use advertising campaigns to … its advertising campaign. The two rival firms care only about capturing a dominant share of the relevant market. Hence, if … strategies yields a clear and unique prediction about the outcome of the advertising game …

We study the strategic interaction between a new good producer and a remanufacturer who use advertising campaigns to … its advertising campaign. The two rival firms care only about capturing a dominant share of the relevant market. Hence, if … strategies yields a clear and unique prediction about the outcome of the advertising game …

We study the strategic interaction between a new good producer and a remanufacturer who use advertising campaigns to … its advertising campaign. The two rival firms care only about capturing a dominant share of the relevant market. Hence, if … strategies yields a clear and unique prediction about the outcome of the advertising game …

advertising on television (TV) to compete for a greater share of the market of a particular good. Government regulations limit the … total amount of negative advertising time either firm can buy. The two rival firms choose how much negative advertising time … this equilibrium is unique. Finally, we ascertain the amount of negative advertising time the two firms would buy if they …

advertising on television (TV) to compete for a greater share of the market of a particular good. Government regulations limit the … total amount of negative advertising time either firm can buy. The two rival firms choose how much negative advertising time … this equilibrium is unique. Finally, we ascertain the amount of negative advertising time the two firms would buy if they …