I study a class of agency problems that are characterized by the existence of an underlying organizational hierarchy. Specifically, I analyze a two forked, three tiered hierarchy and I show that when the private information of the players in the second and in the third tiers of the hierarchy,...

The following is a description of the paper, and not the actual abstract as it appeared in the journal. In this paper we analyze the problem faced by an asymmetrically informed supra-national governmental authority (SNGA) who wishes to design an International Environmental Agreement (IEA). We...

I analyze the problem faced by an asymmetrically informed supranational governmental authority (SNGA) with limited financial resources who wishes to design an International Environmental Agreement (IEA). The SNGA cannot contract directly with polluting firms in the various LDCs, but he must deal...

We study the provision of information to tourists in a probabilistic setting. Specifically, we provide answers to three hitherto unstudied questions in the tourism literature. We first delineate a continuous-time Markov chain (CTMC) model of a tourist information center (TIC) and then we compute...

We study the provision of information to tourists in a probabilistic setting. Specifically, we provide answers to three hitherto unstudied questions in the tourism literature. We first delineate a continuous-time Markov chain (CTMC) model of a tourist information center (TIC) and then we compute...

In this paper we focus on a married couple and analyze a game of marital infidelity. The husband can either be faithful to or cheat on his wife. The wife decides how much effort to expend monitoring her husband and she chooses monitoring effort m∈[0,1]. Our analysis of this strategic...

The n total consumers in the market for a particular good are made up of b brown and g green consumers so that b g=n. The b brown (g green) consumers are not (are) environmentally conscious and hence they prefer to buy a new (remanufactured) good denoted by N and R respectively. By strategically...

In this paper we focus on a married couple and analyze a game of marital infidelity. The husband can either be faithful to or cheat on his wife. The wife decides how much effort to expend monitoring her husband and she chooses monitoring effort m∈[0,1]. Our analysis of this strategic...

The n total consumers in the market for a particular good are made up of b brown and g green consumers so that b g=n. The b brown (g green) consumers are not (are) environmentally conscious and hence they prefer to buy a new (remanufactured) good denoted by N and R respectively. By strategically...

In this note we analyze a game model of marital infidelity. The husband can either be faithful to or cheat on his wife. The wife can either monitor or not monitor her husband. We first determine the best response correspondences of the two players. Second, we explain why there is no...