We study how tax policy affects the competition for venture capital by the creative class in two regions A and B. The creative class in each region produces a final good with venture capital and creative capital. Venture capital moves freely between the two regions and the representative...

We study how tax policy affects the competition for venture capital by the creative class in two regions A and B. The creative class in each region produces a final good with venture capital and creative capital. Venture capital moves freely between the two regions and the representative...

We focus on an aggregate economy of two nearby cities A and B and study whether it is possible for the leviathan governments in these two cities to use taxes τA and τB to attract members of the so-called creative class. The creative class population is fixed and members locate either in city A...

We analyze how deterministic political competition between the elites and the so-called creative class shapes economic outcomes in a stylized region. By deterministic, we mean a case where political power has shifted from the elites to the creative class with probability one. There are three...

We analyze inefficiency and inequality associated with the use of creative capital to produce a final good. We first study a case in which the creative capital units are perfect substitutes in the production of the final good. We show that the equilibrium outcome is inefficient and that there is...