Note: The following is a description of the paper and not the actual abstract as it appeared in the print journal. I study the pollution control problem faced by an imperfectly informed supra-national governmental authority (SNGA) that wants to design an international environmental agreement...

This paper analyzes the problem faced by an imperfectly informed supra-national governmental authority (SNGA) with restricted funds that wishes to design an International Environmental Agreement (IEA) for developing countries (DCs). The SNGA contracts with polluting firms through their...

We analyze a two-period signaling model in which a representative entrepreneur in a regional economy has a project that generates a random cash flow and that requires investment that the entrepreneur raises from a competitive market. The project’s type is known to the entrepreneur but not to...

We analyze a two-period signaling model in which a representative entrepreneur in a regional economy has a project that generates a random cash flow and that requires investment that the entrepreneur raises from a competitive market. The project's type is known to the entrepreneur but not to the...

I study a class of agency problems that are characterized by the existence of an underlying organizational hierarchy. Specifically, I analyze a two forked, three tiered hierarchy and I show that when the private information of the players in the second and in the third tiers of the hierarchy,...

We use a two period model to analyze the contractual relationship between entrepreneurs and venture capitalists in an open regional economy. First, we describe the first best investment contract, we study the second best investment contract in the presence of private information, and then we...