We exploit the public good attributes of Ganges water pollution cleanup and theoretically analyze an aggregate economy … pollution cleanup in these two cities ought to be provided in a centralized or in a decentralized manner. We first determine the … compute the optimal amount of water pollution cleanup in the two cities in a decentralized regime in which spending on cleanup …

pollution in the river caused by tanneries in Kanpur, India. We focus on two tanneries, A and B, that are situated on the same … production depends on labor use, the chemical waste generated by tannery A, and the natural pollution absorbing capacity of the … reduction in the natural capacity of the Ganges to absorb pollution in the time interval [0,t]. Second, we use this metric and …

pollution in the river caused by tanneries in Kanpur, India. We focus on two tanneries, A and B, that are situated on the same … production depends on labor use, the chemical waste generated by tannery A, and the natural pollution absorbing capacity of the … reduction in the natural capacity of the Ganges to absorb pollution in the time interval [0,t]. Second, we use this metric and …

We study how spillovers from water pollution cleanup in the Ganges affect social welfare in an aggregate economy … consisting of Kanpur and Varanasi, two cities through which this river flows. We view pollution cleanup in both cities as a local … public good and point out that, if Kanpur cleans up pollution in the Ganges, then Varanasi obtains some spillover benefit and …

IEAs satisfy budget balance and because there is a ceiling on the amount of pollution reduction that an IEA can require …, the level and pattern of pollution abatement are not ideal. The analysis of this paper suggests that IEAs are not doomed … IEAs is dependent on the funds available for environmental protection and the pollution reduction ceiling negotiated by the …

in a Bertrand game will immiserize that nation, are specified. Second, the effects of pollution control by means of … various price control instruments in a Bertrand game in which governments care about world pollution but polluting firms do … is the most useful pollution control instrument. In contrast, when the two nations are dissimilar, it is shown that there …

with a self-financing constraint, should an environmental authority (EA) raise/lower pollution taxes over time or should it …

country in a Cournot game will make that country worse off when the incidence of pollution is domestic. Second, we study the … governments care about international pollution, but polluting firms do not. It is shown that there are plausible theoretical …, it is shown that in choosing between alternate pollution control instruments, national governments typically face a …

faced with a self-financing constraint, should an environmental authority (EA) raise/lower pollution taxes over time or …