We provide the first contract-theoretic analysis of how best to sell package tours to heterogeneous tourists in an environment with asymmetrically held information. Our analysis has three practical implications. First, asymmetric information tends to hamper package tour sales. Second, some...

We analyze a two-period signaling model in which a representative entrepreneur in a regional economy has a project that generates a random cash flow and that requires investment that the entrepreneur raises from a competitive market. The project's type is known to the entrepreneur but not to the...

I study a class of agency problems that are characterized by the existence of an underlying organizational hierarchy. Specifically, I analyze a two forked, three tiered hierarchy and I show that when the private information of the players in the second and in the third tiers of the hierarchy,...

We analyze a market for microfinance in a region of a developing nation in which all projects are either of high or low quality. There is adverse selection because only borrowers know whether their project is of high or low quality but the microfinance institutions (MFIs) do not. The MFIs are...

We study the decision question faced by an imperfectly informed supra-national governmental authority (SNGA) that intends to design an International Environmental Agreement (IEA). This SNGA can't interact directly with the externality causing firms in the developing countries (DCs), and it must...

The following is a description of the paper, and not the actual abstract as it appeared in the journal. In this paper we analyze the problem faced by an asymmetrically informed supra-national governmental authority (SNGA) who wishes to design an International Environmental Agreement (IEA). We...

In a two-period model, economists such as K.J. Arrow, A.C. Fisher, and C. Henry, have shown that when development is both indivisible and irreversible, a developer who ignores the possibility of obtaining new information about the outcome of such development will invariably underestimate the...

I analyze the problem faced by an asymmetrically informed supranational governmental authority (SNGA) with limited financial resources who wishes to design an International Environmental Agreement (IEA). The SNGA cannot contract directly with polluting firms in the various LDCs, but he must deal...