We analyze the hitherto unstudied duopolistic interaction between a new good producer and a remanufacturer who compete for a dominant share of the market for a particular product. Each firm i spends d_i ≥ 0 on product development to sway consumers and this expenditure increases the likelihood...

We analyze the hitherto unstudied duopolistic interaction between a new good producer and a remanufacturer who compete for a dominant share of the market for a particular product. Each firm i spends d_i ≥ 0 on product development to sway consumers and this expenditure increases the likelihood...

We study a one-period model of an aggregate economy composed of cities and regions that demand vaccines designed to fight a pandemic such as Covid-19. The supply of vaccines is the outcome of Bertrand competition between two firms A and B. The marginal cost of producing the vaccine for both...