I model the interaction between a regulator and polluting firms as a Stackelberg differential game in which the regulator leads. The firms create pollution, which results in a stock externality. I analyze the intertemporal effects of alternate pollution control measures in a competitive...

In this paper, we study the commuting behavior of citizens living in or near a city who must decide how to get to work. Such citizens can always use their own car and drive to work. However, they can also take public transport to work. The two public transport options we consider involve taking...

The following is a description of the paper, and not the actual abstract as it appeared in the journal. In this paper we analyze the problem faced by an asymmetrically informed supra-national governmental authority (SNGA) who wishes to design an International Environmental Agreement (IEA). We...

In this paper, we ask the following question. Why is it that despite the universal recognition of the need for global environmental protection, developing countries have been lax in instituting stringent environmental regulations? Addressing this question from an economic perspective, we study...

I analyze the problem faced by an asymmetrically informed supranational governmental authority (SNGA) with limited financial resources who wishes to design an International Environmental Agreement (IEA). The SNGA cannot contract directly with polluting firms in the various LDCs, but he must deal...

I propose a queuing theoretic research agenda for analyzing five queries about the impacts that alternate invasive species control regulations have on consumers and producers in a nation such as the USA. The five queries are as follows. First, when can one justify a trade ban as an effective...