We analyze the impact of globalization on individual gains from trade in a general equilibrium model of monopolistic competition featuring product diversity, pro-competitive effects and income heterogeneity between and within countries. We show that, although trade reduces markups in both...

We analyze the impact of globalization on individual gains from trade in a general equilibrium model of monopolistic competition featuring product diversity, pro-competitive effects and income heterogeneity between and within countries. We show that, although trade reduces markups in both...

We analyze the impact of globalization on individual gains from trade in a general equilibrium model of monopolistic competition featuring product diversity, pro-competitive effects and income heterogeneity between and within countries. We show that, although trade reduces markups in both...

We analyze a class of 'large group' Chamberlinian monopolistic competition models using multiplicatively quasi-separable (MQS) and additively quasi-separable (AQS) functions. We first prove that the MQS and AQS functions are equivalent to the 'constant relative risk aversion' (CRRA) and...

We analyze the equilibrium and the optimal resource allocations in a monocentric city undermonopolistic competition. Unlike the constant elasticity of substitution (CES) case, wherethe equilibrium markups are independent of the city size, we present a variable elasticity ofsubstitution (VES)...

We develop a model of a city populated by heterogeneous agents. Agents self-select into entrepreneurship, and entrepreneurs set up firms which hire workers. We characterize the equilibrium matching between firms and workers, as well as the within-city assignment of agents to locations. We then...

We characterize the equilibrium and optimal resource allocations in a general equilibrium model of monopolistic competition with multiple asymmetric sectors and heterogeneous firms. We first derive general results for additively separable preferences and general productivity distributions, and...

We develop a monopolistic competition model with two sectors and heterogeneous agents who self-select into entrepreneurship, depending on entrepreneurial ability. The effect of market size on the equilibrium share of entrepreneurs crucially hinges on properties of the lower-tier utility function...

The Henry George Theorem (HGT) states that, in first-best economies, the fiscal surplus of a city government that finances the Pigouvian subsidies for agglomeration externalities and the costs of local public goods by a 100% tax on land is zero at optimal city sizes. We extend the HGT to...

We develop a model of a city populated by heterogeneous agents. Agents self-select into entrepreneurship, and entrepreneurs set up firms which hire workers. We characterize the equilibrium matching between firms and workers, as well as the within-city assignment of agents to locations. We then...