We study a one-period model of an aggregate economy composed of cities and regions that demand vaccines designed to fight a pandemic such as Covid-19. The supply of vaccines is the outcome of Bertrand competition between two firms A and B. The marginal cost of producing the vaccine for both...

We provide a theoretical justification for bi-sourcing, which refers to thesituation where a final goods producer buys an input from an outside supplier and alsoproduces it in-house. Bi-sourcing occurs if the marginal cost of producing the input inhouseis higher than the marginal cost of outside...

We demonstrate the sensitivity of the location of downstream firms, engaged in sequential spatial competition, to the vertical structure of an industry where no downstream firm can produce all varieties demanded.

This analysis is a natural follow up of continued efforts to assess the consequences of cross-border mergers in industries with a vertical structure. Absent free trade, in a vertically related industry, the downstream firms will not choose the social optimum under spatial price discrimination...

We visit the role of privatization in the location decision of firms in an industry where no firm can produce all varieties demanded. We demonstrate that the Nash equilibrium locations are socially optimal, in the presence of a publicly owned firm, notwithstanding the degree of privatization.

This analysis is a natural follow up of continued efforts to assess the consequences of cross-border mergers in industries with a vertical structure. Absent free trade, in a vertically related industry, the downstream firms will not choose the social optimum under spatial price discrimination...

We provide a new rationale for bi-sourcing, which refers to the situation where a final goods producer buys an input from an outside supplier and also produces it in-house. We also show the effects of the product market competition and the implications of different and common outside input...

We demonstrate the sensitivity of the location of downstream firms, engaged in sequential spatial competition, to the vertical structure of an industry where no downstream firm can produce all varieties demanded.