We examine board structure in France, which since 1966 has allowed firms the freedom to choose between unitary and two-tier boards. We analyze how this choice relates to characteristics of the firm and its environment. Firms with severe asymmetric information tend to opt for unitary boards;...

We examine board structure in France, which since 1966 has allowed firms freedom to choose between unitary and two-tier boards. We analyze how this choice relates to characteristics of the firm and its environment. Firms with severe asymmetric information tend to opt for unitary boards; firms...

The AFEP-MEDEF corporate governance code amended in 2013 introduces the say on pay principle, which grants shareholders the right to vote on executive remuneration at annual general meetings. This paper aims at reviewing the studies undertaken in countries that have established this principle...

Contemporary governance reform proposals focus on strengthening board monitoring but recent theoretical models find that a passive board is often optimal. We examine board structure choice in France where for 45 years firms have been free to choose between a unitary board and a dual board...

Many governance reform proposals focus on strengthening board monitoring. In contrast, Adams and Ferreira (2007) and Harris and Raviv (2008) conclude that a passive board is often optimal. We examine determinants of board structure choice in France, where firms are free to choose between a...

Loyalty shares, mechanisms designed to encourage long-term share ownership through disproportional ownership rights, face questions regarding their benefits and costs. We examine these questions through a natural experiment – the passage of the Florange Act in France – which required firms...