I provide a short survey on recent research on the governance of closely held corporations. I focus on the strategic choice of ownership structure, the creation of family firms and the role of the board in the closely held corporation. Attention is payed to policyimplications of the research...

We analyze a closely held corporation characterized by the absence of a resale market for shares and by potentially having several significant shareholders. The founder of the firm may optimally choose to distribute voting power to several large shareholders since this forces them to form...

Political involvement in the operation of an enterprise, whether it is private or state owned, creates opportunities for interest groups to influence the allocation of resources. Resource allocation transfers rent both between unions and private owners within the firm and between these organized...

In a large sample of European firms we analyze the value discount associated with disproportional ownership structures first documented by Claessens et al (2002). Consistent with a theoretical model of incentives and entrenchment effects, we find higher value discount in family firms, in firms...

Political involvement in the operation of an enterprises, whether it is private or state owned, creates opportunities for interest groups to influence the allocation of resources. I analyze how the influence externality arising form the interest groups´lobby activities disables the Coase...

The importance of ownership structure is analyzed in a simple voting framework. The model contains a market failure arising from the market not internalizing the total surplus from trade and a political failure arising from the government catering to the interests of the median voter. In a...

We analyze a closely held corporation characterized by the absence of a resale market for shares and by potentially having several significant shareholders. The founder of the firm may optimally choose to distribute voting power to several large shareholders since this forces them to form...

Political involvement in the operation of an enterprise, whether it is private or state owned, creates opportunities for interest groups to influence the allocation of resources. Resource allocation transfers rent both between unions and private owners within the firm and between these organized...

I provide a short survey on recent research on the governance of closely held corporations. I focus on the strategic choice of ownership structure, the creation of family firms and the role of the board in the closely held corporation. Attention is payed to policyimplications of the research...

Recent policy initiatives within the harmonization of European company laws have promoted a so-called "principle of proportionality" through proposals that regulate mechanisms opposing a proportional distribution of ownership and control. We scrutinize the foundation for these initiatives by...