We model entry by entrepreneurs into new markets in developing economies with regulatory barriers in the form of … licence fees and bureaucratic delay. Because laissez faire leads to ‘excessive’ entry, a licence fee can increase welfare by … discouraging entry. However, in the presence of a licence fee, bureaucratic delay creates a strategic opportunity, which can result …

We analyze a mixed oligopoly with free entry by private firms, assuming that a public firm maximizes an increasing …

We model entry by entrepreneurs into new markets in developing economies with regulatory barriers in the form of … licence fees and bureaucratic delay. Because laissez faire leads to 'excessive' entry, a licence fee can increase welfare by … discouraging entry. However, in the presence of a licence fee, bureaucratic delay creates a strategic opportunity, which can result …

We model entry by entrepreneurs into new markets in developing economies with regulatory barriers in the form of … licence fees and bureaucratic delay. Because laissez faire leads to 'excessive' entry, a licence fee can increase welfare by … discouraging entry. However, in the presence of a licence fee, bureaucratic delay creates a strategic opportunity, which can result …

entry in this context. …

We model entry by entrepreneurs into new markets in developing economies with regulatory barriers in the form of … licence fees and bureaucratic delay. Because laissez faire leads to ‘excessive’ entry, a licence fee can increase welfare by … discouraging entry. However, in the presence of a licence fee, bureaucratic delay creates a strategic opportunity, which can result …