We examine the strategic interaction in the market for physician services when the total budget for reimbursement is fixed. We show that this prospective payment system involves { compared to a fee-for-service remuneration system { a severe coordination problem, which potentially leads to the...

We examine the strategic interaction in the market for physician services when the total budget for reimbursement is fixed. We show that this prospective payment system involves - compared to a fee-for-service remuneration system - a severe coordination problem, which potentially leads to the...

We examine the strategic interaction in the market for physician services when the total budget for reimbursement is fixed. We show that this prospective payment system involves ƒ{ compared to a fee-for-service remuneration system ƒ{ a severe coordination problem, which potentially leads to...

We examine the strategic interaction in the market for physician services when the total budget for reimbursement is fixed. We show that this prospective payment system involves compared to a fee-for-service remuneration system a severe coordination problem, which potentially leads to the...

We examine the strategic interaction in the market for physician services when the total budget for reimbursement is fixed. We show that this prospective payment system involves ƒ{ compared to a fee-for-service remuneration system ƒ{ a severe coordination problem, which potentially leads to...