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Robust Predictions in Games with Incomplete Information
Bergemann, Dirk; Morris, Stephen - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2011
correlated equilibria in a class of games with quadratic payoffs and normally distributed uncertainty in terms of restrictions on … demand uncertainty and find newly optimal information policies via the Bayes correlated equilibria. Finally, we reverse the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009386343
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Robust Predictions in Games with Incomplete Information
Bergemann, Dirk; Morris, Stephen - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2011
which establishes a relationship between the set of Bayes Nash equilibria and the set of Bayes correlated equilibria. We … completely characterize the set of Bayes correlated equilibria in a class of games with quadratic payoffs and normally …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009322932
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Robust Predictions in Games with Incomplete Information
Bergemann, Dirk; Morris, Stephen - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2011
equilibrium for some information structure is equal to the set of Bayes correlated equilibria. We completely characterize the set … of Bayes correlated equilibria in a class of games with quadratic payoffs and normally distributed uncertainty in terms … sharing among firms under demand uncertainty and find new optimal information policies via the Bayes correlated equilibria. We …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010686938
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Robust Predictions in Games with Incomplete Information
Bergemann, Dirk; Morris, Stephen - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2011
correlated equilibria in a class of games with quadratic payoffs and normally distributed uncertainty in terms of restrictions on … demand uncertainty and find newly optimal information policies via the Bayes correlated equilibria. Finally, we reverse the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010686940
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Information and Volatility
Bergemann, Dirk; Heumann, Tibor; Morris, Stephen - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2013
In an economy of interacting agents with both idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks, we examine how the information structure determines aggregate volatility. We show that the maximal aggregate volatility is attained in a noise free information structure in which the agents confound idiosyncratic...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010817221
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Nonlinear Pricing with Finite Information
Bergemann, Dirk; Shen, Ji; Xu, Yun; Yeh, Edmund M. - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2015
We analyze nonlinear pricing with finite information. A seller offers a menu to a continuum of buyers with a continuum of possible valuations. The menu is limited to offering a finite number of choices representing a finite communication capacity between buyer and seller. We identify necessary...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011124281
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Multi-dimensional Mechanism Design with Limited Information
Bergemann, Dirk; Shen, Ji; Xu, Yun; Yeh, Edmund M. - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2012
We analyze a nonlinear pricing model with limited information. Each buyer can purchase a large variety, d, of goods. His preference for each good is represented by a scalar and his preference over d goods is represented by a d-dimensional vector. The type space of each buyer is given by a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010895638
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Information, Interdependence, and Interaction: Where Does the Volatility Come From?
Bergemann, Dirk; Heumann, Tibor; Morris, Stephen - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2013
We analyze a class of games with interdependent values and linear best responses. The payoff uncertainty is described by a multivariate normal distribution that includes the pure common and pure private value environment as special cases. We characterize the set of joint distributions over...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010895692
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Information and Volatility
Bergemann, Dirk; Heumann, Tibor; Morris, Stephen - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2013
In an economy of interacting agents with both idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks, we examine how the structure of private information influences aggregate volatility. The maximal aggregate volatility is attained in a noise free information structure in which the agents confound idiosyncratic and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010938545
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Entry and Vertical Differentiation
Bergemann, Dirk; Valimaki, Juuso - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2000
This paper analyzes the entry of new products into vertically differentiated markets where an entrant and an incumbent compete in quantities. The value of the new product is initially uncertain and new information is generated through purchases in the market. We derive the (unique) Markov...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005762809