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Bergemann, Dirk; Said, Maher - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2010

We survey the recent literature on designing auctions and mechanisms for dynamic settings. Two settings are considered: those with a dynamic population of agents whose private information remains fixed throughout time; and those with a fixed population of agents whose private information changes...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008505985

Dynamic Auctions: A Survey

Bergemann, Dirk; Said, Maher - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2010

We survey the recent literature on designing auctions and mechanisms for dynamic settings. Two settings are considered: those with a dynamic population of agents or buyers whose private information remains fixed throughout time; and those with a fixed population of agents or buyers whose private...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008540612

Market Experimentation and Pricing

Bergemann, Dirk; Valimaki, Juuso - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 1996

We present a continuous-time model of Bayesian learning in a duopolistic market. Initially the value of one product offered is unknown to the market. The market participants learn more about the true value of the product as experimentation occurs over time. Firms set prices to induce...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005093954

Market Diffusion with Two-Sided Learning

Bergemann, Dirk; Valimaki, Juuso - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 1996

The diffusion of a new product of uncertain value is analyzed in a duopolistic market in continuous time. The two sides of the market, buyers and sellers, learn the true value of the new product over time as a result of experimentation. Buyers have heterogeneous preferences over the products and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005463873

Bergemann, Dirk; Morris, Stephen - In: Theoretical Economics 11 (2016) 2, pp. 487-522

. The characterization corresponds to the set of (a version of) incomplete information correlated equilibria which we dub … Bayes correlated equilibria. We identify a partial order on many player information structures (individual sufficiency …) under which more information shrinks the set of Bayes correlated equilibria. This order captures the role of information in …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599575

Countering the winner's curse: Optimal auction design in a common value model

Bergemann, Dirk; Brooks, Ben; Morris, Stephen - In: Theoretical Economics 15 (2020) 4, pp. 1399-1434

We characterize revenue maximizing mechanisms in a common value environment where the value of the object is equal to the highest of biddersâ€™ independent signals. If the object is optimally sold with probability one, then the optimal mechanism is simply a posted price, with the highest...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013189042

The Limits of Price Discrimination

Bergemann, Dirk - 2013

We analyze the welfare consequences of a monopolist having additional information about consumers' tastes, beyond the prior distribution; the additional information can be used to charge different prices to different segments of the market, i.e., carry out "third degree price discrimination."We...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013082002

Extremal Information Structures in the First Price Auction

Bergemann, Dirk - 2013

equilibria across all information structures, and we report simulations of properties of the set of all equilibria …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013072963

The Comparison of Information Structures in Games : Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and Individual Sufficiency

Bergemann, Dirk - 2013

Bayes correlated equilibrium: The set of outcomes that can arise in Bayes Nash equilibria of an incomplete information game … equivalent to the set of Bayes correlated equilibria.A game of incomplete information can be decomposed into a basic game, given … equilibria. We discuss the relation of the solution concept to alternative definitions of correlated equilibrium in incomplete …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013076008

Information Design, Bayesian Persuasion and Bayes Correlated Equilibrium

Bergemann, Dirk - 2016

A set of players have preferences over a set of outcomes. We consider the problem of an "information designer" who can choose an information structure for the players to serve his ends, but has no ability to change the mechanism (or force the players to make particular action choices). We...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013001526