Showing 1 - 10 of 136
We study the classic sequential screening problem under ex-post participation constraints. Thus the seller is required to satisfy buyers' ex-post participation constraints. A leading example is the online display advertising market, in which publishers frequently cannot use up-front fees and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012962543
We characterize revenue maximizing auctions when the bidders are intermediaries who wish to resell the good. The bidders have differential information about their common resale opportunities: each bidder privately observes an independent draw of a resale opportunity, and the highest signal is a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012949875
We study the classic sequential screening problem under ex-post participation constraints. Thus the seller is required to satisfy buyers' ex-post participation constraints. A leading example is the online display advertising market, in which publishers frequently cannot use up-front fees and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012954382
We study a linear interaction model with asymmetric information. We first characterize the linear Bayes Nash equilibrium for a class of one dimensional signals. It is then shown that this class of one dimensional signals provide a comprehensive description of the first and second moments of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012955894
We study the classic sequential screening problem in the presence of buyers' ex-post participation constraints. A leading example is the online display advertising market, in which publishers frequently do not use up-front fees and instead use transaction-contingent fees. We establish conditions...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012916488
We characterize revenue maximizing mechanisms in a common value environment where the value of the object is equal to the highest of bidders' independent signals. The optimal mechanism exhibits either neutral selection, wherein the object is randomly allocated at a price that all bidders are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011948704
We study the classic sequential screening problem in the presence of ex-post participation constraints. We establish necessary and sufficient conditions that determine exhaustively when the optimal selling mechanism is either static or sequential. In the static contract, the buyers are not...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012866350
We study the classic sequential screening problem in the presence of ex post participation constraints. We establish necessary and sufficient conditions that determine when the optimal selling mechanism is either static or sequential. In the static contract, the buyers are not screened with...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012837749
We characterize revenue maximizing mechanisms in a common value environment where the value of the object is equal to the highest of bidders’ independent signals. If the object is optimally sold with probability one, then the optimal mechanism is simply a posted price, with the highest...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012415457
We consider truthful implementation of the socially efficient allocation in a dynamic private value environment in which agents receive private information over time. We propose a suitable generalization of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism, based on the marginal contribution of each agent. In...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012776491