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minimal disclosure regime each bidder only learns privately whether he won or lost the auction. In equilibrium the allocation …
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independent values across bidders. The values are assumed to be perfectly persistent over time.We analyze the first-price auction … disclosure regime, in which each bidder only learns privately whether he won or lost the auction at the end of each round. In … equilibrium, the winner of the initial auction lowers his bids over time, while losers keep their bids constant, in anticipation …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013139373
We explore the impact of private information in sealed-bid first-price auctions. For a given symmetric and arbitrarily correlated prior distribution over values, we characterize the lowest winning-bid distribution that can arise across all information structures and equilibria. The information...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013004045
We explore the impact of private information in sealed bid first price auctions. For a given symmetric and arbitrarily correlated prior distribution over values, we characterize the lowest winning bid distribution that can arise across all information structures and equilibria. The information...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013011350
minimal disclosure regime each bidder only learns privately whether he won or lost the auction. In equilibrium the allocation …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013047743
This paper explores the consequences of information in sealed bid first price auctions. For a given symmetric and arbitrarily correlated prior distribution over valuations, we characterize the set of possible outcomes that can arise in a Bayesian equilibrium for some information structure. In...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013017815
We explore the impact of private information in sealed-bid first-price auctions. For a given symmetric and arbitrarily correlated prior distribution over values, we characterize the lowest winning-bid distribution that can arise across all information structures and equilibria. The information...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012992717
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012515932