We survey the recent literature on the role of information in mechanism design. First, we discuss an emerging … literature on the role of endogenous payoff and strategic information for the design and the efficiency of the mechanism. We … specifically consider information management in the form of acquisition of new information or disclosure of existing information …

We explore the impact of private information in sealed-bid first-price auctions. For a given symmetric and arbitrarily … information structures and equilibria. The information and equilibrium attaining this minimum leave bidders indifferent between …

We explore the impact of private information in sealed bid first price auctions. For a given symmetric and arbitrarily … information structures and equilibria. The information and equilibrium attaining this minimum leave bidders uncertain whether they …

We study a linear interaction model with asymmetric information. We first characterize the linear Bayes Nash … information structure.We use our results in a variety of applications: (i) we study the connections between incomplete information … and strategic interaction, (ii) we explain to what extent payoff environment and information structure of a economy are …

private information influences aggregate volatility. The maximal aggregate volatility is attained in a noise free information … over actions and states that can arise in equilibrium under any information structure. This tractable characterization …, extending results in Bergemann and Morris, can be used to address a wide variety of questions linking information with the …

We explore the impact of private information in sealed-bid first-price auctions. For a given symmetric and arbitrarily … information structures and equilibria. The information and equilibrium attaining this minimum leave bidders indifferent between …

which agents receive private information over time. We propose a suitable generalization of the Vickrey …

We explore the impact of private information in sealed-bid first-price auctions. For a given symmetric and arbitrarily … information structures and equilibria. The information and equilibrium attaining this minimum leave bidders indifferent between …

In an economy of interacting agents with both idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks, we examine how the information … structure determines aggregate volatility. We show that the maximal aggregate volatility is attained in a noise free information … joint distributions over actions and states that can arise in equilibrium under any information structure. This tractable …