In this paper, we consider a model that suggests that the theory of exchange with asymmetric information seems suitable to provide a possible explanation model of occurrence and duration of civil wars. We show that although civil conflicts are not Pareto optimal ex post they may be Pareto...

This paper is a theoretical introduction to modern governance of universities in developing countries. Indeed, adopting the approach of the paradigm of the theory of incentives Laffont and Tirole (1993), this paper discusses the effects of the presence of information asymmetry between the State...

We develop a model of intergeneratioal coresidence and transfers within the family in a setting of asymmetric information. Following an exchange motive altruistic parents receive services from their children, who may make them financial gifts in return. However, parents do not know the privacyc...

In this paper, we consider a two-period model of migration and remittances as implicit contract in a context of asymmetric information. Our model offers new theoretical findings with respect to the previous literature on the main determinants of remittances. According to self-interest thesis,...

Three theoretical hypotheses can explain the motives behind familial transfers given to the elders : altruism, exchange, and the demonstration effect theory where adults have to set an example by helping their elders if they want to be helped in turn by their children. This paper focuses on a...

In this paper, we extend the framework of the motives for familial solidarities to three generations. By focusing on upward transfers, we examine the demonstration effect hypothesis where individuals make transfers to their parents in order to be helped in return by their children. We show the...

In this paper, we examine the consequences of imperfect information on the pattern of transfers from parents to children. Drawing on the theory of mechanism design, we consider a model of family contract with two levels of effort. We prove that equal transfers among children are expected under...

We consider the role of asymmetric information on the emergenceof collusion between criminals and enforcers, in the framework proposed by Bowles and Garoupa (1997) and Polinsky and Shavell (2001). Our paper proposes that the optimal criminal sanction for the underlying o®ense is not necessarily...

The present paper is motivated by the interest of a more thorough analysis of the determinants of remittances for developing countries. Thus, a simple formal remittance behaviour model is provided in which the amounts of the sums transferred are negatively related to the migrants’ individual...