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Norms, incentives and information in income insurance
Lindbeck, Assar; Persson, Mats - 2015
insured individuals. Thus, the functioning of social norms depends crucially on information, in particular on what norm … enforcers are able to observe about an insured individual's behavior. Information is also decisive when distinguishing between …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010482983
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Subjective evaluation versus public information
Bester, Helmut; Münster, Johannes - 2013
This paper studies a principal-agent relation in which the principal's private information about the agent's effort … and not on the public signal. Nonetheless, public information is valuable as it facilitates truthful subjective evaluation …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009781395
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Subjective evaluation versus public information
Bester, Helmut; Münster, Johannes - 2013
This paper studies a principal-agent relation in which the principal's private information about the agent's effort … and not on the public signal. Nonetheless, public information is valuable as it facilitates truthful subjective evaluation …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009752336
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Credence goods, costly diagnosis, and subjective evaluation
Bester, Helmut; Dahm, Matthias - 2014
We study contracting between a consumer and an expert. The expert can invest in diagnosis to obtain a noisy signal about whether a low-cost service is sufficient or whether a high-cost treatment is required to solve the consumerś problem. This involves moral hazard because diagnosis effort and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010429934
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Optimal procurement of a credence good under limited liability
Bester, Helmut; Yaofu, Ouyang - 2017
might misrepresent his private information about the consumer’s need, (ii) the expert might not choose the requested service … decreases or increases the likelihood of undertreatment, however, depends on the accuracy of the expert's information. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011781931
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Credence goods, costly diagnosis, and subjective evaluation
Bester, Helmut; Dahm, Matthias - 2014
We study contracting between a consumer and an expert. The expert can invest in diagnosis to obtain a noisy signal about whether a low-cost service is sufficient or whether a high-cost treatment is required to solve the consumer's problem. This involves moral hazard because diagnosis effort and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010436207
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Credence goods, costly diagnosis, and subjective evaluation
Bester, Helmut; Dahm, Matthias - 2014
We study contracting between a consumer and an expert. The expert can invest in diagnosis to obtain a noisy signal about whether a low-cost service is sufficient or whether a high-cost treatment is required to solve the consumer's problem. This involves moral hazard because diagnosis effort and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010436518
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Credence goods, costly diagnosis, and subjective evaluation
Bester, Helmut; Dahm, Matthias - 2014
We study contracting between a consumer and an expert. The expert can invest in diagnosis to obtain a noisy signal about whether a low-cost service is sufficient or whether a high-cost treatment is required to solve the consumer's problem. This involves moral hazard because diagnosis effort and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011444292
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Price commitment in search markets
Bester, Helmut - 1993
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000852006
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Price commitment in search markets
Bester, Helmut - In: Journal of economic behavior & organization : JEBO 25 (1994) 1, pp. 109-120
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001169050