agents who are uncertain about each other's fighting potential. We model the default option of outright conflict as a … probabilistic contest. Examples of such contests may be international conflict, litigation, and elections. We show, in particular …, that if the loss of surplus from outright conflict is small enough, then any mechanism must assign a positive probability …

potential. Applications include international conflict, litigation, and elections. Even though only a peaceful agreement avoids … a loss of resources, if this loss is small enough, then any mechanism must assign a positive probability of conflict. We … show how the likelihood of conflict outbreak depends on the distribution of power between the agents and their information …

potential. Applications include international conflict, litigation, and elections. Even though only a peaceful agreement avoids … a loss of resources, if this loss is small enough, then any contract must assign a positive probability of conflict. We … show how the likelihood of conflict outbreak depends on the distribution of power between the agents and their information …

This paper analyzes fairness and bargaining in a dynamic bilateral matching market. Traders from both sides of the … market are pairwise matched to share the gains from trade. The bargaining outcome depends on the traders' fairness attitudes … in isolated bilateral bargaining. …

This paper analyzes fairness and bargaining in a dynamic bilateral matching market. Traders from both sides of the … market are pairwise matched to share the gains from trade. The bargaining outcome depends on the traders' fairness attitudes … in isolated bilateral bargaining. …

This paper examines the commitment effect of delegated bargaining when renegotiation of the delegation contract cannot …