frictions, both parties in a match are partially locked-in when they bargain over the joint surplus from their sunk investments … case of investments in homogenous capital only the agents on the short side acquire ownership of capital. There is always …

investments at the market entry stage. Investment incentives depend on search frictions because both parties in a match are … partially locked-in when they bargain over the joint surplus from their sunk investments. The associated holdup problem is more … important for the long side of the market. In the extreme case of perfectly substitutable investments only the agents on the …

frictions, both parties in a match are partially locked-in when they bargain over the joint surplus from their sunk investments … case of investments in homogenous capital only the agents on the short side acquire ownership of capital. There is always …

investments. The associated holdup problem depends on market conditions and is more important for the long side of the market. In … the case of investments in homogenous capital only the agents on the short side acquire ownership of capital. There is …

frictions, both parties in a match are partially locked-in when they bargain over the joint surplus from their sunk investments … case of investments in homogenous capital only the agents on the short side acquire ownership of capital. There is always …

frictions, both parties in a match are partially locked-in when they bargain over the joint surplus from their sunk investments … case of investments in homogenous capital only the agents on the short side acquire ownership of capital. There is always …

frictions, both parties in a match are partially locked-in when they bargain over the joint surplus from their sunk investments … case of investments in homogenous capital only the agents on the short side acquire ownership of capital. There is always …