Using a panel of survey-based annual investor relations (IR) rankings of European companies, we provide evidence suggesting that the marginal benefit of IR is greater in countries with capital markets that are less outside-shareholder oriented. For firms located in these countries, we find that...

We test the hypothesis that the marginal benefit of investment in investor relations (IR) is greater in countries where capital market institutions are generally less developed and tailored to a more concentrated ownership structure. We use a large panel of survey-based annual IR rankings of...

Using a panel of survey-based annual investor relations (IR) rankings of European companies, we provide evidence suggesting that the marginal benefit of IR is greater in countries with capital markets that are less outside-shareholder oriented. For firms located in these countries, we find that...

Using a panel of survey-based annual investor relations (IR) rankings of European companies, we provide evidence suggesting that the marginal benefit of IR is greater in countries with capital markets that are less outside-shareholder oriented. For firms located in these countries, we find that...

A change in the index selection rules of Deutsche Börse provides a unique opportunity to investigate the drivers behind the decision to a bolish dual-class shares. As of June 2002, selection is based on the market capitalization of the free-float of the more liquid share class rather than the...

In the pre-Sarbanes-Oxley era corporate insiders were required to report trades in shares of their firm until the 10th of the month following the trade. This gave them considerable flexibility to time their trades and reports strategically, e.g., by executing a sequence of trades and reporting...

Regulations in the pre-Sarbanes-Oxley era allowed corporate insiders considerable flexibility in strategically timing their trades and SEC filings, for example, by executing several trades and reporting them jointly after the last trade. We document that even these lax reporting requirements...

Regulations in the pre-Sarbanes–Oxley era allowed corporate insiders considerable flexibility in strategically timing their trades and SEC filings, e.g., by executing several trades and reporting them jointly after the last trade. We document that even these lax reporting requirements were...

Until October 2004 corporate insiders in Germany were required to report trades in the shares of their firm "without delay". In practice substantial reporting delays were common. We show that the delays are systematically related to the characteristics of the firm. Delays are longer in...