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Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000812560
The present paper reconsiders the inside innovators’ licensing problem under incomplete information. Employing an optimal mechanism design approach, we show that, contrary to what is claimed in the literature, the optimal mechanism may prescribe fixed fees, royalty rates lower than the cost...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011285324
The third generation UMTS auction in Germany raised an enormous amount of revenue, and at the same time achieved a more competitive market structure than other UMTS auctions in Europe. The present paper explains the design of that auction, and presents a game theoretic explanation of observed...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011400807
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001756833
The third generation UMTS auction in Gremany raised an enormous amount of revenue, and the same time achieved a more competitive market structure than other UMTS auctions in Europe. The present paper explains the design of that auction, and presents a game theoretic explanation of observed...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001624203
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003795845
We consider a licensing mechanism for process innovations that combines a license auction with royalty contracts to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003935644
scheme that combines a first-price license auction with royalty contracts for losers. Prior to bidding firms observe …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003935649
&D investments and license innovations. In equilibrium R&D joint ventures are formed and licensing occurs in a way that eliminates …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010343942
license their innovations and to pool their R&D investments. We show that in equilibrium R&D joint ventures are formed and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010371077