We propose a new climate policy that is efficient, robust, and asks for payments proportional to realized climate damage. In each period, countries are made liable for their share of the responsibility in the current damage. Efficiency follows from countries' anticipations of climate change,...

We introduce basic needs in cost-sharing problems so that agents with higher needs are not penalized, all the while holding them responsible for their consumption. We characterize axiomatically two families of cost-sharing rules, each favoring one aspect — compensation or responsibility —...

We envision the creation of a climate liability market to address climate change. Each period, countries would be made liable for their past responsibility in current climate damage. We show that this yields the same first-best incentives to reduce emissions as a Pigovian tax. Also, because...

Due to meteorological factors, the distribution of the environmental damage due to climate change bears no relationship to that of global emissions. We argue in favor of offsetting this discrepancy, and propose a “global insurance scheme” to be financed according to countries’...