Showing 1 - 8 of 8
In kidney exchange programmes patients with end-stage renal failure may exchange their willing, but incompatible living donors among each other. National kidney exchange programmes are in operation in ten European countries, and some of them have already conducted international exchanges through...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012382114
In this paper we present simulations for international kidney exchange programmes (KEPs). KEPs are organised in more than ten countries in Europe to facilitate the exchanges of immunologically incompatible donors. The matching runs are typically conducted in every three months for finding...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014537086
When two students with the same score are competing for the last slot at a university programme in a central admission scheme then different policies may apply across countries. In Ireland only one of these students is admitted by a lottery. In Chile both students are admitted by slightly...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014554950
In a two-sided matching market when agents on both sides have preferences the stability of the solution is typically the most important requirement. However, we may also face some distributional constraints with regard to the minimum number of assignees or the distribution of the assignees...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014554956
The college admission problem (CAP) has been studied extensively in the last 65 years by mathematicians, computer scientists and economists following the seminal paper of Gale and Shapley (1962). Their basic algorithm, the so called deferred acceptance mechanism always returns a student optimal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014554957
We develop Integer Programming (IP) solutions for some special college admission problems arising from the Hungarian higher education admission scheme. We focus on four special features, namely the solution concept of stable score-limits, the presence of lower and common quotas, and paired...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014554983
In a two-sided matching market when agents on both sides have preferences the stability of the solution is typically the most important requirement. However, we may also face some distributional constraints with regard to the minimum number of assignees or the distribution of the assignees...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014562719
To overcome incompatibility issues, kidney patients may swap their donors. In international kidney exchange programmes (IKEPs), countries merge their national patient–donor pools. We consider a recently introduced credit system. In each round, countries are given an initial “fair”...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014584278