We provide empirical evidence on how the practice of competitive benchmarking affects chief executive officer (CEO) pay. We find that the use of benchmarking is widespread and has a significant impact on CEO compensation. One view is that benchmarking is inefficient because it can lead to...

We provide empirical evidence on how the practice of competitive benchmarking affects CEO pay. We find that the use of benchmarking is widespread, and has a significant impact on levels and changes in CEO compensation. The practice is controversial and one view is that it is inefficient because...

We test theories of managerial entrenchment and ability matching by examining the relation between CEO turnover and the level of firm diversification. Our results indicate that CEO turnover in diversified firms is completely insensitive to firm performance. Additional analysis indicates that for...

We provide empirical evidence on how the practice of competitive benchmarking affects CEO pay. We find that the use of benchmarking is widespread, and has a significant impact on levels and changes in CEO compensation. The practice is controversial and one view is that it is inefficient because...