This paper presents a new method how to elicit the Bernoulli utility function over a wide range of monetary outcomes using approximation through Taylor expansion. The new method is applied to the natural experiment provided by the Swiss version of the television show Deal or No Deal.

In the television show Deal or No Deal a contestant is endowed with a sealed box containing a monetary prize between one cent and half a million euros. In the course of the show the contestant is offered to exchange her box for another sealed box with the same distribution of possible monetary...

In the television show Deal or No Deal a contestant is endowed with a sealed box, which potentially contains a large monetary prize. In the course of the show the contestant learns more information about the distribution of possible monetary prizes inside her box. Consider two groups of...

We select a menu of seven popular decision theories and embed each theory in five models of stochastic choice including tremble, Fechner and random utility model. We find that the estimated parameters of decision theories differ significantly when theories are combined with different models....

In the television show Deal or No Deal an individual faces a sequence of binary choices between a risky lottery with equiprobable prizes of up to half a million euros and a monetary amount for certain. The decisions of 348 contestants from Italian and British versions of the show are used to...

Loss aversion is traditionally defined in the context of lotteries over monetary payoffs. This paper extends the notion of loss aversion to a more general setup where outcomes (consequences) may not be measurable in monetary terms and people may have fuzzy preferences over lotteries, i.e. they...

This paper presents a new two-parameter probability weighting function for Tversky and Kahneman (1992) cumulative prospect theory as well as its special cases — Quiggin (1981) rank-dependent utility and Yaari (1987) dual model. The proposed probability weighting function can be inverse...

Conventional parameterizations of cumulative prospect theory do not explain the St. Petersburg paradox. To do so, the power coefficient of an individual's utility function must be lower than the power coefficient of an individual's probability weighting function

Intertemporal choice is intuitively analogous to choice under risk/uncertainty when outcomes are viewed as consequences received in an uncertain future. "Discounted incremental utility" (DIU) model of intertemporal choice parallels expected utility representation of risk preferences. DIU...

Risk preferences of Australian academia are elicited by analyzing the aggregate distribution of their retirement funds (superannuation) across available investment options. Not more than 10% of retirement funds are invested as if their owners maximize expected utility under the assumption of...