Abstract We consider multiple-type housing markets. To capture the dynamic aspect of trade in such markets, we study a dynamic recontracting process similar to the one introduced by Serrano and Volij (2008). First, we analyze the set of recurrent classes of this process as a (non-empty) solution...

We consider multiple-type housing markets. To capture the dynamic aspect of trade in such markets, we study a dynamic recontracting process similar to the one introduced by Serrano and Volij (2008). First, we analyze the set of recurrent classes of this process as a (non-empty) solution concept....

We consider multiple-type housing markets. To capture the dynamic aspect of trade in such markets, we study a dynamic recontracting process similar to the one introduced by Serrano and Volij (2005). First, we analyze the set of recurrent classes of this process as a (non-empty) solution concept....

We discuss a problem concerning Dasgupta, Hammond, and Maskin''s (1979) definition of a rich domain and a very well-known result they established for these domains: on rich domains, if a social choice function is implementable in Nash strategies, then it is truthfully implementable in dominant...

The Muller–Satterthwaite Theorem (J Econ Theory 14:412–418, <CitationRef CitationID="CR13">1977</CitationRef>) establishes the equivalence between Maskin monotonicity and strategy-proofness, two cornerstone conditions for the decentralization of social choice rules. We consider a general model that covers public goods economies as in...</citationref>