We analyze the benefits and costs of a non-euro country opting-in to the banking union. The decision to opt-in depends on the comparison between the assessment of the banking union attractiveness and the robustness of a national safety net. The benefits of opting-in are still only potential and...

We analyze the benefits and costs of a non-euro country opting-in to the banking union. The decision to opt-in depends on the comparison between the assessment of the banking union attractiveness and the robustness of a national safety net. The benefits of opting-in are still only potential and...

The European sovereign debt crisis has revealed severe flaws in the design of the internal market. Both, private and public borrowers had incentives for excessive borrowing, which have been created by deficits in the regulatory structure of financial markets. Capital requirements for banks were...

Die europäische Schuldenkrise hat zentrale Defizite des Binnenmarkts offengelegt. Regulatorische Defizite haben Anreize geschaffen, eine zu hohe Verschuldung einzugehen. Zwar wurde eine einheitliche Geldpolitik verfolgt, gleichzeitig aber die Kompetenzen für die Aufsicht und Restrukturierung...