We formalize the notion of monotonicity with respect to first-order stochastic dominance in the context of preferences defined over the set of temporal lotteries. It is shown that the only Kreps and Porteus (1978) preferences which are both stationary and monotone are Uzawa preferences and...

We formalize the notion of monotonicity with respect to first-order stochastic dominance in the context of preferences defined over the set of temporal lotteries. It is shown that the only Kreps and Porteus (1978) preferences which are both stationary and monotone are Uzawa preferences and...

We investigate whether the set of Kreps and Porteus (1978) preferences include classes of preferences that are stationary, monotonic and well-ordered in terms of risk aversion. We prove that the class of preferences introduced by Hansen and Sargent (1995) in their robustness analysis is the only...

This paper argues for an alternative methodology to estimate the value of risk to life. By relaxing the assumption of additive separability, we introduce risk aversion with respect to the length of life and show that the extended model better fits available data. This is crucial for the...

The standard literature on the value of life relies on Yaari’s (1965) model, which includes an implicit assumption of risk neutrality with respect to life duration. To overpass this limitation, we extend the theory to a simple variety of nonadditively separable preferences. The enlargement we...

The standard literature on the value of life relies on Yaari’s (1965) model, which includes an implicit assumption of risk neutrality with respect to life duration. To overpass this limitation, we extend the theory to a simple variety of preferences which are not necessarily additively...

We consider a formal approach to comparative risk aversion and applies it to intertemporal choice models. This allows us to ask whether standard classes of utility functions, such as those inspired by Kihlstrom and Mirman [15], Selden [26], Epstein and Zin [9] and Quiggin [24] are well-ordered...

This paper suggests a new explanation for the low level of annuitization, which is valid even if one assumes perfect markets. We show that, as soon there exists a positive bequest motive, sufficiently risk averse individuals should not purchase annuities. A model calibration accounting for...

In this paper, the assumption of monotonicity of Anscombe and Aumann (1963) is replaced by a weaker assumption of monotonicity with respect to first order stochastic dominance. I derive a representation result where ambiguous distributions of objective beliefs are first aggregated into...

Experts often disagree. A decision-maker may be averse to such expert disagreement. Existing models of aversion to expert disagreement rest on ambiguity-averse preferences adopting a unanimity principle: If all experts consider one choice better than another, so should the decision-maker. Such...