characterized by matching frictions and costly screening. When effort in improving ability raises both the mean and the variance of … the resulting ability distribution, multiple equilibria may arise. In the high-effort equilibrium, heterogeneity in … ability is sufficiently large to induce firms to select the best workers, thereby confirming the belief that effort is …

characterized by matching frictions and costly screening. When effort in improving ability raises both the mean and the variance of … the resulting ability distribution, multiple equilibria may arise. In the high-effort equilibrium, heterogeneity in … ability is sufficiently large to induce firms to select the best workers, thereby confirming the belief that effort is …

characterized by matching frictions and costly screening. When effort in improving ability raises both the mean and the variance of … the resulting ability distribution, multiple equilibria may arise. In the high-effort equilibrium, heterogeneity in … ability is sufficiently large to induce firms to select the best workers, thereby confirming the belief that effort is …

We study a dynamic model where growth requires both long-term investment and the selection of talented managers. When … ability is not ex-ante observable and contracts are incomplete, managerial selection imposes a cost, as managers facing the … selection and investment that has implications for the choice of contractual relationships. Our analysis shows that rigid long …

We study a dynamic model where growth requires both long-term investment and the selection of talented managers. When … ability is not ex-ante observable and contracts are incomplete, managerial selection imposes a cost, as managers facing the … selection and investment that has implications for the choice of contractual relationships and institutions. Our analysis shows …

We study a dynamic model where growth requires both long-term investment and the selection of talented managers. When … ability is not ex-ante observable and contracts are incomplete, managerial selection imposes a cost, as managers facing the … selection and investment that has implications for the choice of contractual relationships. Our analysis shows that rigid long …

We study a dynamic model where growth requires both long-term investment and the selection of talented managers. When … ability is not ex-ante observable and contracts are incomplete, managerial selection imposes a cost, as managers facing the … selection and investment that has implications for the choice of contractual relationships and institutions. Our analysis shows …

We study a dynamic model where growth requires both long-term investment and the selection of talented managers. When … ability is not ex-ante observable and contracts are incomplete, managerial selection imposes a cost, as managers facing the … selection and investment that has implications for the choice of contractual relationships. Our analysis shows that rigid long …

firms shows that trade leads to between-firm reallocations and selection: it shifts employment towards firms with the best …