firms shows that trade leads to between-firm reallocations and selection: it shifts employment towards firms with the best …

unobservable. On the one hand, elections improve accountability and allow to keep well-performing incumbents. On the other … voters. To do so, it proposes a model of elections where political ability is ex-ante unknown and investment in reforms is …

unobservable. On the one hand, elections improve accountability and allow to keep well-performing incumbents. On the other … voters. To do so, it proposes a model of elections where political ability is ex-ante unknown and investment in reforms is …

unobservable. On the one hand, elections improve accountability and allow to keep well-performing incumbents. On the other … voters. To do so, it proposes a model of elections where political ability is ex-ante unknown and investment in reforms is …

is ex-ante unknown and policy choices are not perfectly observable. On the one hand, elections improve accountability and … allow to keep well-performing incumbents. On the other, politicians invest too little in costly policies with future returns …

unobservable. On the one hand, elections improve accountability and allow to keep well-performing incumbents. On the other … voters. To do so, it proposes a model of elections where political ability is ex-ante unknown and investment in reforms is …

unobservable. On the one hand, elections improve accountability and allow to keep well-performing incumbents. On the other … voters. To do so, it proposes a model of elections where political ability is ex-ante unknown and investment in reforms is …