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We model how unemployment benefit sanctions - benefit reductions that are imposed if unemployed do not comply with job search guidelines - affect unemployment. In our analysis we find that not only micro effects concerning the behavior of individual unemployed workers are relevant, but also...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011318597
This paper analyzes the design of optimal unemployment insurance in a search equilibrium framework where search effort among the unemployed is not perfectly observable. We examine to what extent the optimal policy involves monitoring of search effort and benefit sanctions if observed search is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011405528
This paper analyzes the design of optimal unemployment insurance in a search equilibrium framework where search e¤ort among the unemployed is not perfectly observable. We examine to what extent the optimal policy involves monitoring of search effort and benefit sanctions if observed search is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011408413
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001617303
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001624905
This paper analyzes the design of optimal unemployment insurance in a search equilibrium framework where search eÞort among the unemployed is not perfectly observable. We examine to what extent the optimal policy involves monitoring of search effort and benefit sanctions if observed search is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001635530
We model how unemployment benefit sanctions - benefit reductions that are imposed if unemployed do not comply with job search guidelines - affect unemployment. In our analysis we find that not only micro effects concerning the behavior of individual unemployed workers are relevant, but also...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001460511
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001650053
This paper analyzes the design of optimal unemployment insurance in a search equilibrium framework where search effort among the unemployed is not perfectly observable. We examine to what extent the optimal policy involves monitoring of search effort and benefit sanctions if observed search is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001654795
This paper analyzes the design of optimal unemployment insurance in a search equilibrium framework where search effort among the unemployed is not perfectly observable. We examine to what extent the optimal policy involves monitoring of search effort and benefit sanctions if observed search is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011574977