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Consumers, when buying health insurance, do not know the exact value of each treatment that they buy coverage for. This leads them to overvalue some treatments and undervalue others. We show that the insurance market cannot correct these mistakes. This causes research labs to overinvest in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084438
This paper introduces three methodological advances to study the optimal design of static and dynamic markets. First, we apply a mechanism design approach to characterize all incentive-compatible market equilibria. Second, we conduct a normative analysis, i.e. we evaluate alternative competition...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008562775
This paper introduces three methodological advances to study the optimal design of static and dynamic markets. First, we apply a mechanism design approach to characterize all incentive-compatible market equilibria. Second, we conduct a normative analysis, i.e. we evaluate alternative competition...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014197389
This paper introduces optimal competition: the best form of competition in an industry that a competition authority can achieve under the information constraint that it cannot observe firms' effciency levels. We show that the optimal competition outcome in an industry becomes more competitive as...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014071806
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This paper introduces a tractable model of health insurance with both moral hazard and adverse selection. We show that government sponsored universal basic insurance should cover treatments with the biggest adverse selection problems. Treatments not covered by basic insurance can be covered on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084307
This paper shows that selection incentives in downstream markets distort upstream prices. It is possible for inputs to be priced above the value that the good has for final consumers. We apply this framework to pharmaceutical companies selling drugs to a health insurance market with adverse...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014079724
We study optimal risk adjustment in imperfectly competitive health insurance markets when high-risk consumers are less likely to switch insurer than low-risk consumers. First, we find that insurers still have an incentive to select even if risk adjustment perfectly corrects for cost differences...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013123527