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Career concerns, inaction and market inefficiency : evidence from utility regulation
Borenstein, Severin; Busse, Meghan R.; Kellogg, Ryan - In: The journal of industrial economics 60 (2012) 2, pp. 220-247
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009658850
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Career Concerns, Inaction, and Market Inefficiency: Evidence from Utility Regulation
Borenstein, Severin; Busse, Meghan R.; Kellogg, Ryan - 2010
This paper examines how career concerns can generate inefficiencies not only within firms but also in market outcomes. Career concerns may lead agents to avoid actions that, while value-increasing in expectation, could potentially be directly associated with a bad outcome. We apply this theory...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010230437
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Electricity restructuring : deregulation or reregulation?
Borenstein, Severin; Bushnell, James B. - In: Regulation : the Cato review of business and government 23 (2000) 2, pp. 46-52
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001492675
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Carrot and Yardstick regulation : enhancing market performance with output prizes
Bagnoli, Mark Edward - In: Journal of regulatory economics 3 (1991) 2, pp. 115-136
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001106729
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Career Concerns, Inaction, and Market Inefficiency : Evidence from Utility Regulation
Busse, Meghan R. - 2011
This paper examines how career concerns can generate inefficiencies not only within firms but also in market outcomes. Career concerns may lead agents to avoid actions that, while value-increasing in expectation, could potentially be directly associated with a bad outcome. We apply this theory...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013130519
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Principal-Agent Incentives, Excess Caution, and Market Inefficiency : Evidence from Utility Regulation
Borenstein, Severin - 2007
Regulators and firms often use incentive schemes to attract skillful agents and to induce them to put forth effort in pursuit of the principals' goals. Incentive schemes that reward skill and effort, however, may also punish agents for adverse outcomes beyond their control. As a result, such...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012775480
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Principal-agent Incentives, Excess Caution, and Market Inefficiency : Evidence From Utility Regulation
Borenstein, Severin - 2007
Regulators and firms often use incentive schemes to attract skillful agents and to induce them to put forth effort in pursuit of the principals' goals. Incentive schemes that reward skill and effort, however, may also punish agents for adverse outcomes beyond their control. As a result, such...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012464967
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The power and the limits of industrial organization
Borenstein, Severin - In: Review of industrial organization : RIO 48 (2016) 3, pp. 241-246
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011660333
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Electricity Restructuring : Deregulation or Reregulation?
Borenstein, Severin; Bushnell, James - 2000
The article discusses the lessons that can be gleaned from experience to date with electricity restructuring. Long-term gains from restructuring are most likely to be the result of more efficient and prudent long-term investments. Although restructuring could have near-term benefits for society,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014151446
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Economic Regulation and Its Reform : What Have We Learned?
Borenstein, Severin (contributor);  … - 2014
market intervention. Economic Regulation and Its Reform collects research by a group of distinguished scholars who explore … requires a careful assessment of the costs and benefits of imperfect regulation. Moreover, government interventions may take a … policies and barriers to entry. This volume introduces the key issues surrounding economic regulation, provides an assessment …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014482115