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Transfers and exchange-stability in two-sided matching problems
Lazarova, Emiliya A.; Borm, Peter; Estévez-Fernández, … - 2014
uses the fact that the core of an associated compensation matching game with constraints is nonempty. …In this paper we consider one-to-many matching problems where the preferences of the agents involved are represented by … matching to a matching of maximum total reward, one can always provide a compensation schedule that will be ex-post stable in …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010373726
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Kingmakers and leaders in coalition formation
Kilgour, Marc; Brams, Steven J. - 2009
Assume that players strictly rank each other as coalition partners. We propose a procedure whereby they "fall back" on their preferences, yielding internally compatible, or coherent, majority coalition(s), which we call fallback coalitions. If there is more than one fallback coalition, the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008810998
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A Bargaining Set Based on External and Internal Stability and Endogenous Coalition Formation
Lazarova, Emiliya A. - 2006
A new bargaining set based on notions of both internal and external stability is developed in the context of endogenous coalition formation. It allows to make an explicit distinction between within-group and outside-group deviation options. This type of distinction is not present in current...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012733871
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Kingmakers and Leaders in Coalition Formation
Kilgour, D. Marc - 2009
Assume that players strictly rank each other as coalition partners. We propose a procedure whereby they 'fall back' on their preferences, yielding internally compatible, or coherent, majority coalition(s), which we call fallback coalitions. If there is more than one fallback coalition, the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013157458
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Transfers and Exchange-Stability in Two-Sided Matching Problems
Lazarova, Emiliya; Borm, Peter; Estévez-Fernández, Arantza - Tinbergen Instituut - 2014
uses the fact that the core of an associated compensation matching game with constraints is nonempty. …In this paper we consider one-to-many matching problems where the preferences of the agents involved are represented by … matching to a matching of maximum total reward, one can always provide a compensation schedule that will be ex-post stable in …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257556
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Transfers and Exchange-Stability in Two-Sided Matching Problems
Lazarova, Emiliya; Borm, Peter; Estévez-Fernández, Arantza - 2014
uses the fact that the core of an associated compensation matching game with constraints is nonempty. …In this paper we consider one-to-many matching problems where the preferences of the agents involved are represented by … matching to a matching of maximum total reward, one can always provide a compensation schedule that will be ex-post stable in …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010491315
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Two-Sided Matchings : An Algorithm for Ensuring They are Minimax and Pareto-Optimal
Brams, Steven J. - 2013
Gale and Shapley (1962) proposed the deferred-acceptance algorithm for matching (i) college applicants and colleges and … always Pareto-optimal: No other matching is at least as good for all the players and better for one or more. If there are …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013079383
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Characterizing the core via k-core covers
Sánchez-Rodríguez, Estela; Borm, Peter; … - 2013
shown that the core of a TU-game coincides with the core of the corresponding minimal rights game. Moreover, the paper … introduces the notion of the k-core cover as an extension of the core cover. The k-core cover of a TU-game consists of all … minimal rights game. It is shown that the core of a TU-game with player set N coincides with the L|N |/2-̦core cover …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010224779
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Characterizing Compromise Stability of Games Using Larginal Vectors
Platz, Trine T.; Hamers, Herbert; Quant, Marieke - 2011
The core cover of a TU-game is a superset of the core and equals the convex hull of its larginal vectors. A larginal … called compromise stable if the core is equal to the core cover, i.e. the core is the convex hull of the larginal vectors. In … larginal vector of the set is a core element, then the game is compromise stable. The first characterization of these sets is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014181798
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Nontransferable utility bankruptcy games
Estévez-Fernández, Arantza; Borm, Peter; … - 2014
merge convex and ordinal convex. Generalizing the notions of core cover and compromise stability for transferable utility …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010250500