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On Three Shapley-Like Solutions for Cooperative Games with Random Payoffs

Timmer, Judith; Borm, Peter; Tijs, Stef H. - 2000

Three solution concepts for cooperative games with random payoffs are introduced. These are the marginal value, the dividend value and the selector value. Inspiration for their definitions comes from several equivalent formulations of the Shapley value for cooperative TU games. An example shows...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014144998

Job Scheduling, Cooperation, and Control

Calleja, Pedro; Estevez-Fernandez, Arantza; Borm, Peter; … - 2015

This paper considers one machine job scheduling situations or sequencing problems, where clients can have more than a single job to be processed in order to get a final output. Moreover, a job can be of interest for different players. This means that one of the main assumptions in classic...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014028825

Three-valued simple games

Musegaas, Marieke; Borm, Peter; Quant, Marieke - 2015

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011350040

Cooperative games in graph structure

Herings, Peter Jean-Jacques; Laan, Gerard van der; … - 2000

of ones. We then define the balanced-core as a refinement ofthe core. A payoff vector lies in the balanced-core if it … lies in the core andthe payoff vector is an element of payoff sets of all graphs in some balanced collection ofgraphs. We … prove that any balanced graph game has a nonempty balanced-core.We conclude by some examples showing the usefulness of the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011303860

Step out - step in sequencing games

Musegaas, Marieke; Borm, Peter; Quant, Marieke - 2014

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011285003

Demand adjustment in coalitional games

Laan, Gerard van der; Pruzhansky, Vitaly - 2004

This paper associates a strategic n-person game with a given transferable utility game and studies its Nash equilibria. Strict equilibria in this model characterize those divisions of social surplus that can become conventions in the sense of Young (1993). It is shown that even in relatively...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011342576

The Average Tree Solution for Cooperative Games with Communication Structure

Herings, P. Jean-Jacques; Laan, Gerard van der; Talman, Dolf - Tinbergen Instituut - 2008

-convexity, under which the game is shown to have a non-empty core and the average tree solution lies in the core. In general, link …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255465

The Harsanyi Set for Cooperative TU-Games

Vasil'ev, Valeri; Laan, Gerard van der - Tinbergen Instituut - 2001

Harsanyi set is related to the Core and Weberset. We also characterize the Harsanyi mapping as the unique mappingsatisfying a …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256545

The Restricted Core for Totally Positive Games with Ordered Players

Brink, René van den; Laan, Gerard van der; Vasil'ev, Valeri - Tinbergen Instituut

nonnegative), and there is some hierarchical ordering of the players. In this paper we introduce the 'Restricted Core' for such … of the players. For totally positive games this solution is always contained in the 'Core', and contains the well … coalitions). For special orderings it equals the Core, respectively Shapley value. We provide an axiomatization and apply this …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256619

Games on Union Closed Systems

Brink, Rene van den; Katsev, Ilya; Laan, Gerard van der - Tinbergen Instituut - 2011

coalitions also their union is feasible. Properties of solutions (the core, the nucleolus, the prekernel and the Shapley value …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257183