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Herings, Peter Jean-Jacques; Laan, Gerard van der; … - 2000

of ones. We then define the balanced-core as a refinement ofthe core. A payoff vector lies in the balanced-core if it … lies in the core andthe payoff vector is an element of payoff sets of all graphs in some balanced collection ofgraphs. We … prove that any balanced graph game has a nonempty balanced-core.We conclude by some examples showing the usefulness of the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011303860

The myopic stable set for social environments

Demuynck, Thomas; Herings, Peter Jean-Jacques; Saulle, … - 2017

core is non-empty; with the set of stable matchings in the standard one-to-one matching model; with the set of pairwise …, the myopic stable set is a superset of the core and of the set of pure strategy Nash equilibria in noncooperative games … myopic stable set coincides with the coalition structure core in coalition function form games if the coalition structure …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011660119

Strong Nash Equilibria and the Potential Maximizer

van Megen, Freek; Facchini, Giovanni; Borm, Peter; … - 1997

A class of non cooperative games characterized by a "congestion effect" is studied, in which there exists a strong Nash equilibrium, and the set of Nash equilibria, the set of strong Nash equilibria and the set of strategy profiles maximizing the potential function coincide. The structure of the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014087763

A Taxonomy of Best-Reply Multifunctions in 2x2x2 Trimatrix Games

Borm, Peter; Hendrickx, Ruud; Gonzalez-Alcon, C.; van … - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 2007

This paper provides an overview of the various shapes the best- reply multifunctions can take in 2×2×2 trimatrix games. It is shown that, unlike in 2×2 bimatrix games, the best replies to the opponents’ pure strategies do not completely determine the structure of the Nash equilibrium set.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011091516

A Taxonomy of Best-Reply Multifunctions in 2x2x2 Trimatrix Games

Gonzalez-Alcon, Carlos M.; Borm, Peter; Hendrickx, Ruud - 2007

This paper provides an overview of the various shapes the bestreply multifunctions can take in 2x2x2 trimatrix games. It is shown that, unlike in 2x2 bimatrix games, the best replies to the opponents pure strategies do not completely determine the structure of the Nash equilibrium set

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014052878

Informationally robust equilibria

Reijnierse, Hans (contributor); Borm, Peter (contributor); … - 2003 - [Elektronische Ressource]

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001773660

Informationally Robust Equilibria

Reijnierse, Hans; Borm, Peter; Voorneveld, Mark - 2004

Informationally Robust Equilibria (IRE) are introduced in Robson (1994) as a refinement of Nash equilibria for e.g. bimatrix games, i.e. mixed extensions of two person finite games. Similar to the concept of perfect equilibria, basically the idea is that an IRE is a limit of some sequence of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014071560

The myopic stable set for social environments

Demuynck, Thomas; Herings, Peter Jean-Jacques; Saulle, … - 2017

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011590217

The myopic stable set for social environments

Demuynck, Thomas; Herings, Peter Jean-Jacques; Saulle, … - 2018 - RM/17/002 revised

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011788213

A differentiable homotopy to compute nash equilibria of n-person games

Herings, Peter Jean-Jacques; Peeters, Ronald - In: Economic theory : official journal of the Society for … 18 (2001) 1, pp. 159-185

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001592826