A large literature uses matching models to analyze markets with two-sided heterogeneity, studying problems such as the … matching of students to schools, residents to hospitals, husbands to wives, and workers to firms. The analysis typically … assumes that the agents have complete information, and examines core outcomes. We formulate a notion of stable outcomes in …

We formulate a notion of stable outcomes in matching problems with one-sided asymmetric information. The key conceptual …

A large literature uses matching models to analyze markets with two-sided heterogeneity, studying problems such as the … matching of students to schools, residents to hospitals, husbands to wives, and workers to firms. The analysis typically … assumes that the agents have complete information, and examines core outcomes. We formulate a notion of stable outcomes in …

We formulate a notion of stable outcomes in matching problems with one-sided asymmetric information. The key conceptual …

We formulate a notion of stable outcomes in matching problems with one-sided asymmetric information. The key conceptual …

We formulate a notion of stable outcomes in matching problems with one-sided asymmetric information. The key conceptual …

uses the fact that the core of an associated compensation matching game with constraints is nonempty. …In this paper we consider one-to-many matching problems where the preferences of the agents involved are represented by … matching to a matching of maximum total reward, one can always provide a compensation schedule that will be ex-post stable in …