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shown that the core of a TU-game coincides with the core of the corresponding minimal rights game. Moreover, the paper … introduces the notion of the k-core cover as an extension of the core cover. The k-core cover of a TU-game consists of all … minimal rights game. It is shown that the core of a TU-game with player set N coincides with the L|N |/2-̦core cover …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010224779
merge convex and ordinal convex. Generalizing the notions of core cover and compromise stability for transferable utility …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010250500
of coalitions are explicitly taken into account. We formulate conditions under which it leads to a core element and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012957744
shown that the core of a TU-game coincides with the core of the corresponding minimal rights game. Moreover, the paper … introduces the notion of the k-core cover as an extension of the core cover. The k-core cover of a TU-game consists of all … minimal rights game. It is shown that the core of a TU-game with player set N coincides with the ⌊|N |/2⌋-core cover …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014038137
This paper considers situations characterized by a common-pool resource, which needs to be divided among agents. Each of the agents has some claim on this pool and an individual reward function for assigned resources. This paper analyzes not only the problem of maximizing the total joint reward,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013128540
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010230607
In this paper, we characterize the class of games for which the core coincides with the core cover (compromise stable … based on bankruptcy problems. Also, the class of convex compromise stable games is characterized. The relation between core …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014029219
A symmetric network consists of a set of positions and a set of bilateral links between these positions. Examples of such networks are exchange networks, communication networks, disease transmission networks, control networks etc. For every symmetric network we define a cooperative transferable...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325263
representation we also define a generalized Bird allocation which we show to be in the core of the corresponding appropriate …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014171035
Three solution concepts for cooperative games with random payoffs are introduced. These are the marginal value, the dividend value and the selector value. Inspiration for their definitions comes from several equivalent formulations of the Shapley value for cooperative TU games. An example shows...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014144998