This paper considers situations characterized by a common-pool resource, which needs to be divided among agents. Each of the agents has some claim on this pool and an individual reward function for assigned resources. This paper analyzes not only the problem of maximizing the total joint reward,...

A class of non cooperative games characterized by a "congestion effect" is studied, in which there exists a strong Nash equilibrium, and the set of Nash equilibria, the set of strong Nash equilibria and the set of strategy profiles maximizing the potential function coincide. The structure of the...

This paper provides an overview of the various shapes the best- reply multifunctions can take in 2×2×2 trimatrix games. It is shown that, unlike in 2×2 bimatrix games, the best replies to the opponents’ pure strategies do not completely determine the structure of the Nash equilibrium set.

We consider the problem of computing the influence of a neuronal structure in a brain network. Abraham, Kotter, Krumnack, and Wanke (2006) computed this influence by using the Shapley value of a coalitional game corresponding to a directed network as a rating. Kotter, Reid, Krumnack, Wanke, and...

A symmetric network consists of a set of positions and a set of bilateral links between these positions. Examples of such networks are exchange networks, communication networks, disease transmission networks, control networks etc. For every symmetric network we define a cooperative transferable...

This article characterizes the per capita nucleolus for bankruptcy games as a bankruptcy rule. This rule, called the cligths rule, is based on the wellknown constrained equal awards principle. The essential feature of the rule however is that, for each bankruptcy problem, it takes into account a...