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The value of information has been the subject of many studies in a strategic context. The central question in these studies is how valuable the information hidden in the chance moves of a game is for one or more of the players. Generally speaking, only the extra possibilities that are beneficial...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014071222
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001830143
This paper provides a flexible strategic framework to analyze bargaining and values in environments with coalitional externalities. Within this framework we propose a new value that extends the Shapley value to partition function form games, the so-called Rational Belief Shapley (RBS) value. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011263578
To model inter-individual externalities and analyze the associated compensation issue, Ju and Borm (2005) introduces a new game-theoretic framework, primeval games, and proposes, from a cooperative perspective, three compensation rules as solution concepts for primeval games: the marginalistic...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014055109
To model inter-individual externalities and analyze the associated compensation issue, Ju and Borm (2005) introduces a new game-theoretic framework, primeval games, and proposes, from a cooperative perspective, three compensation rules as solution concepts for primeval games: the marginalistic...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005416694
AMS Classifications: 91A06; 91A10; 91A12
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011092002
In several jurisdictions, commercially exploiting a game of chance (rather than skill) is subject to a licensing regime. It is obvious that roulette is a game of chance and chess a game of skill, but the law does not provide a precise description of where the boundary between the two classes is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012722321
The concept of Berge equilibria is based on supportive behavior among the players: each player is supported by the group of all other players. In this paper, we extend this concept by maintaining the idea of supportive behavior among the players, but eliminating the underlying coordination...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012852592
Informationally Robust Equilibria (IRE) are introduced in Robson (1994) as a refinement of Nash equilibria for e.g. bimatrix games, i.e. mixed extensions of two person finite games. Similar to the concept of perfect equilibria, basically the idea is that an IRE is a limit of some sequence of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014071560
An aspect of casino games that in general leads to discussions among both participants and spectators, is the relative extent to which a player can positively influence his results by making appropriate strategic choices. This question is closely related to the issue of how to distinguish...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014071564